Bare Metal Cyber

Keyboard Assassins: Inside the Covert World of State-Sponsored Cyber Sabotage
State-sponsored cyber sabotage has rapidly evolved from an occasional espionage tactic into a sophisticated and indispensable component of modern geopolitics. Nations increasingly leverage digital incursions not merely for intelligence gathering, but as powerful instruments of strategic influence, economic disruption, and even covert warfare. From silent cyberattacks on critical infrastructure to subtle espionage embedded deep within corporate supply chains, the digital battlefield offers aggressors plausible deniability, minimal diplomatic repercussions, and devastating effectiveness. Understanding the methods, motivations, and defensive strategies involved is essential not only for cybersecurity professionals but for any organization navigating today’s increasingly complex digital landscape.
The Rise of the Keyboard Nation-State
In the modern age, digital warfare has become an essential extension of traditional foreign policy, much like diplomacy—only considerably sneakier. Think of cyber tools as the soft-power multipliers of today’s geopolitical chess match; no longer confined to embassy meetings or tense phone calls between diplomats, nations now wield keyboards and code with equal, if not greater, effectiveness. Instead of dispatching spies into hostile territory, governments increasingly prefer sending bytes instead of boots. This shift from physical proxies to digital operatives has radically changed international espionage dynamics, making clandestine operations more precise, scalable, and difficult to detect.
One of the appealing aspects for states turning to cyber tactics is the ambiguity it affords. Unlike tanks crossing borders, digital incursions often lack clear markers of national involvement, allowing countries to act boldly without easily traceable fingerprints. This plausible deniability is invaluable, enabling states to conduct espionage or even sabotage without openly violating international norms—at least not blatantly enough to prompt immediate diplomatic retaliation. Aggressors benefit significantly from attribution delays, giving them time to disavow attacks, muddy waters diplomatically, or quietly celebrate their digital victories with little consequence.
History provides several pivot points illustrating how cyber sabotage evolved from theoretical risk into very tangible reality. Take Stuxnet, the sophisticated malware engineered to sabotage Iranian nuclear centrifuges, widely viewed as the watershed moment in state-sponsored cyber sabotage. This was the first major instance where digital weaponry caused measurable, physical damage—marking cyber as an official domain of warfare. Equally significant was the exposure of China’s APT1 espionage unit by cybersecurity firm Mandiant, which detailed industrial-scale intellectual property theft against the U.S. private sector and government.
Russia’s attacks on Georgian government systems during their 2008 conflict marked another milestone, demonstrating cyber’s power to cripple communication channels during traditional warfare. North Korea also got into the action, spectacularly attacking Sony Pictures in 2014, not just leaking embarrassing executive emails but destroying data and effectively weaponizing a private sector hack as a geopolitical statement. Iran, too, wielded its cyber power striking Saudi Aramco and multiple U.S. banks, showcasing its capability to deliver economically devastating blows remotely. Each of these attacks helped define and refine the global understanding of cyber warfare, setting dangerous precedents for the years that followed.
Understanding why espionage went digital is as straightforward as understanding why you’d prefer email over snail mail—it's cheaper, faster, and leaves fewer visible footprints. Traditional spycraft—think dead drops, human assets, and clandestine meetings—can be expensive, risky, and diplomatically hazardous. Cyber espionage reduces overhead dramatically; agents never have to physically cross borders or assume fake identities. Intelligence collection happens in real-time, monitoring adversaries’ communications or strategic plans instantaneously rather than waiting weeks for encoded messages smuggled across borders.
Scalability is another key driver. Digitally, intelligence agencies can monitor hundreds or thousands of targets simultaneously, a feat impossible with conventional espionage methods. Additionally, if caught, digital spies typically face fewer diplomatic repercussions. Nations routinely feign ignorance or innocence, dismissing accusations as unfounded allegations. Such incidents typically fade quietly into diplomatic footnotes rather than escalate into crises, making cyber espionage irresistible to states eager for intelligence without drama.
When it comes to dissecting state-sponsored Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), the keyword is patience. Unlike ordinary cybercriminals driven by rapid profit, APT actors quietly infiltrate networks, patiently mapping internal structures over months or even years. Initial access often comes from strategic spear-phishing—emails carefully crafted to trick privileged users into revealing sensitive credentials. These credentials unlock deeper access, enabling hackers to quietly plant footholds deep inside critical systems. Supply-chain infiltration further complicates matters, embedding malware directly into trusted software updates, bypassing traditional defenses altogether.
Once inside, exfiltration of data occurs under the camouflage of routine network traffic—blending seamlessly into everyday digital activities. When their mission concludes, attackers employ destruct scripts and sophisticated cover-up techniques, deleting logs, overwriting data, and erasing tracks to frustrate investigators. This careful erasure of evidence makes attribution painstaking and slow, further enhancing the deniability advantage of state-sponsored cyber operators.
State motivations extend far beyond mere intelligence gathering. Nations weaponize cyber tools for political leverage, blackmailing adversaries with sensitive personal or strategic information. Economic sabotage through intellectual property theft remains a favored tactic, especially among states seeking to leapfrog technological advancement by stealing trade secrets wholesale. Undermining public trust through strategic leaks, as Russia famously attempted during the 2016 U.S. elections, can weaken adversaries internally without firing a single bullet. Destabilizing democratic processes through misinformation campaigns or targeted hacks also serves geopolitical goals, creating internal divisions and weakening global rivals.
Finally, state actors often utilize cyber operations as a proving ground, testing offensive tools, tactics, and strategies in peacetime scenarios. These rehearsals provide invaluable insights for wartime readiness, allowing cyber warriors to refine their craft undetected. Such continuous probing ensures that when actual conflict arises, keyboard assassins are battle-ready, capable of launching precise digital assaults aimed at critical infrastructure, military command networks, or civilian morale—without a single soldier ever crossing enemy lines.
Nation-State Hacking Tactics Decoded
Zero-days have become the cyber equivalent of exotic weapons stockpiled secretly, ready to disrupt an adversary's systems at precisely the right moment. These exploits, undisclosed vulnerabilities in software unknown even to developers, are traded quietly like arms in clandestine marketplaces. Driven equally by state and criminal demand, zero-day markets blur the ethical lines between legitimate cybersecurity researchers and arms dealers. Often, these powerful exploits are hoarded strategically and deployed just once—ensuring maximum impact and preserving their potency against even modern defenses. This single-use approach complicates defensive responses, as defenders can’t study attacks until it’s too late.
"Living off the land" might sound like survivalist advice, but in cybersecurity circles, it’s a clever, stealthy tactic widely used by nation-state attackers. Instead of relying on easily detectable malware, hackers abuse legitimate, built-in system tools such as PowerShell or Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to carry out their attacks. By exploiting administrative misconfigurations and common management tools, these cyber operatives avoid triggering malware signatures and alarms. Their activity blends seamlessly into ordinary system traffic, mimicking everyday user behavior to evade detection. Think of it as hiding in plain sight, a kind of digital camouflage that allows state actors prolonged, undetected access.
Beyond technical prowess, psychological manipulation has emerged as a favored tactic in the keyboard assassin’s toolkit. Deepfake audio and videos now allow cyber operatives to convincingly impersonate political or business leaders, delivering fake instructions or incendiary statements to cause panic or confusion. The "hack-and-leak" strategy, as seen famously during major elections, seeks not merely to reveal information but to shape narratives and manipulate public perception. Phishing emails are meticulously crafted around current events, exploiting the heightened emotional reactions to global crises, making them significantly more effective. Even fake social media movements, driven by botnets or fake accounts, amplify misinformation and contribute to geopolitical instability.
Infrastructure manipulation takes cyber sabotage to an even darker level, moving beyond data theft to attacks that directly impact physical systems. Critical infrastructure such as power grids and pipelines have become favorite targets, as demonstrated vividly by recent cyberattacks causing prolonged outages and public panic. Cyber actors blur traditional boundaries between digital and physical sabotage, compromising Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and Industrial Control Systems (ICS) to achieve kinetic effects—essentially weaponizing technology to inflict physical harm or disruption. Additionally, hackers plant backdoors in telecom switches and communication networks, ensuring they can disable or manipulate communications during crises or wartime.
State actors have also been known to engage in cyber operations specifically designed to prepare for or support physical military invasions. By disrupting communication channels, disabling defenses, or creating confusion through strategic misinformation, these digital operations lay critical groundwork that enhances the effectiveness of conventional military efforts. Such cyber-kinetic crossover actions showcase just how intertwined cyber warfare has become with traditional military planning, underscoring its status as an integral part of modern state strategy.
When nation-state actors infiltrate networks, their end goal isn't always immediate disruption or data theft; frequently, they're in it for the long haul. Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) demonstrate remarkable patience, often maintaining quiet network presences for months or even years. To ensure sustained access, attackers rotate command-and-control servers regularly, making it exceedingly difficult to fully eradicate their foothold. They also deploy multiple fallback access points, effectively hedging their bets to ensure they retain some level of control even if discovered. Logic bombs—malicious code planted quietly for future activation—lie dormant, waiting patiently for geopolitical triggers or strategic moments to unleash digital chaos.
Waiting for the right geopolitical moment to strike is key to maximizing the strategic benefit of long-game cyber persistence. When diplomatic tensions peak or strategic advantages present themselves, nations activate their embedded cyber tools, creating coordinated disruptions precisely timed for maximum effect. This timing is no coincidence; it reflects strategic alignment between cyber capabilities and broader geopolitical ambitions, highlighting how cyber warfare has evolved into an essential component of national strategy.
Patience, precision, psychological insight, and stealth underpin these state-sponsored hacking strategies. These are not merely tactics of opportunity—they are sophisticated, deliberate actions carried out by skilled adversaries operating with state resources and strategic objectives. Understanding these methodologies not only clarifies the sophistication behind modern cyber threats but also highlights why defensive vigilance must continually evolve in response.
When the Spies Go Corporate
Espionage in the corporate sphere has become a preferred strategy for many nation-states, turning seemingly mundane business operations into prime targets for clandestine cyber operations. Contractors, often with extensive access and weaker defenses, frequently serve as entry points for state-sponsored hackers, quietly compromised to siphon sensitive data. Intellectual property theft, far from occasional opportunism, is actively pursued as a formal policy by multiple nations seeking rapid economic advancement through the fruits of others’ labor. To further obscure their motives, nation-states frequently disguise their cyberattacks as ransomware, allowing plausible deniability while still exacting significant leverage through stolen or encrypted data. Additionally, adversaries systematically map industrial control systems (ICS), patiently preparing digital blueprints of critical infrastructure for future sabotage or exploitation at scale.
The threat extends alarmingly deep into supply chains, where trusted relationships suddenly become liabilities. Trojanized software updates, carefully crafted to appear legitimate, slip malicious payloads quietly into otherwise secure environments—akin to a trusted mechanic installing faulty brakes on your car without your knowledge. Compromised hardware components, sometimes embedded with malicious chips at the manufacturing stage, silently provide backdoor access that even advanced security protocols struggle to detect. Watering hole attacks—compromising developer tools and repositories frequented by legitimate users—turn routine software development into a covert gateway, infecting entire networks at the source. Nation-states use stolen or fraudulent security certificates to lend their malicious software a sheen of authenticity, effectively tricking automated defenses into trusting malware as safe. Weak vendor cybersecurity practices amplify these risks, providing convenient points of entry that compromise even meticulously secured corporate environments.
Beyond theft or sabotage, cyber operations frequently serve as subtle instruments of shadow diplomacy. Governments now commonly send covert messages to rivals through strategic leaks of sensitive data, much like diplomatic telegrams but considerably more embarrassing. Cyberattacks or leaks often serve as thinly veiled retaliation for sanctions, tariffs, or geopolitical disputes—reminding adversaries that diplomacy no longer happens solely in embassies or conference rooms. Hackers sometimes deliberately leave behind digital "calling cards," signature techniques or easily traceable hints, designed to send clear messages without explicit acknowledgment, a type of diplomatic wink-and-nod communication. Similarly, states covertly influence ongoing negotiations by strategically timed cyber intrusions or leaks, silently shaping outcomes without publicly disrupting diplomatic talks. Disinformation campaigns by nation-states provide yet another form of cyber-enabled soft power, subtly shaping global perception without firing a single shot.
Public-private disinformation operations have increasingly blurred the lines between legitimate news, corporate sabotage, and state-level interference. Fake journalists and media platforms, orchestrated by state actors, create convincing facades designed to disseminate misleading stories quickly and widely. Deepfake videos, convincingly replicating CEOs or prominent politicians, can trigger stock market disruptions, policy confusion, or reputational crises overnight. Synthetic protests, orchestrated online through armies of bots and fake accounts, can amplify controversies, triggering real-world chaos and undermining corporate reputations or political stability. Additionally, manipulating financial markets through coordinated online misinformation can swiftly deliver damaging economic blows to targeted organizations. Whisper campaigns, powered by hacked inboxes and strategically leaked communications, spread rumors and internal discord, gradually undermining public trust without obvious external fingerprints.
Industrial control system tampering introduces yet another dimension of cyber espionage, carrying the potential for devastating real-world impacts. Cyber operatives infiltrate ICS environments not merely to collect intelligence but with explicit intent to disrupt operations by crashing vital processes or critical infrastructure. Hackers manipulate sensor data or equipment readings, feeding operators false information that leads to poor decisions or even catastrophic outcomes. Gaining remote control of actuators—critical physical components of industrial systems—allows attackers to quietly test sabotage scenarios in real-time, building comprehensive knowledge for future destructive operations. Quietly testing these sabotage capabilities helps attackers refine their tools and tactics, all while avoiding early detection or alarm. Deliberate delays in production, energy distribution, or manufacturing outputs introduce chaos, financial losses, and, potentially, political pressure points—often fulfilling broader strategic objectives well beyond immediate corporate disruption.
In this corporate battleground, nation-state attackers show remarkable strategic patience and ingenuity, exploiting commercial interactions to achieve national objectives subtly yet powerfully. Each stolen trade secret, compromised supply chain, or manipulated market represents carefully calculated moves within a much broader geopolitical chess game. States increasingly recognize that corporations, infrastructure providers, and financial institutions form essential national assets, whose compromise or disruption yields significant leverage far beyond traditional diplomatic maneuvers. This reality elevates corporate cybersecurity from purely technical concern to urgent national security imperative, with boardrooms becoming frontline command centers in the hidden world of state-sponsored cyber espionage.
The overlap between economic interests, state-level espionage, and cyber warfare has never been clearer or more concerning. Organizations, regardless of size or sector, now find themselves in the unexpected role of geopolitical pawns, unwitting participants in state-sponsored campaigns of espionage, sabotage, and influence. Preparing defenses against such sophisticated adversaries requires understanding these techniques and the geopolitical motives behind them—transforming corporate cybersecurity into a crucial, frontline defense against covert international conflict.
Attribution Games and Plausible Deniability
When nation-states launch cyberattacks, they become masters in the art of blaming someone else, using techniques akin to digital misdirection worthy of a spy novel. Attackers frequently plant false flags—intentional decoy code snippets or misleading cultural markers—designed explicitly to throw cyber investigators off their scent. Sometimes these state-backed groups cleverly borrow tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) from rival APT groups, effectively muddying the forensic waters. Another favored approach is multinational botnet laundering, leveraging compromised computers across dozens of nations, making definitive attribution nearly impossible. Similarly, operating attacks from third-party countries ensures the digital trail leads investigators down complicated geopolitical paths, further obscuring the real culprit.
The complexity of accurately attributing cyber incidents to specific actors lies primarily in the intricately tangled nature of cyber operations themselves. Malware reuse is rampant among threat actors; sophisticated exploits initially created by one group quickly find their way into the toolkits of others, making it difficult to pinpoint the original source. Layered infrastructure, meticulously obfuscated to avoid detection, adds another level of complexity—each attack traverses multiple servers, IP addresses, and jurisdictions. Hackers further complicate attribution by spoofing IP addresses and encrypting payloads, leaving forensic teams chasing digital ghosts. Command-and-control servers are frequently scattered globally, strategically positioned in countries reluctant to cooperate fully, which creates significant delays and frustrations for investigators. This lack of timely international collaboration significantly impedes effective attribution, allowing attackers ample time to disappear into the digital mist.
States are increasingly clever about distancing themselves from direct cyber operations, often relying on criminal gangs or hacker groups with unofficial state ties. These groups act as proxies, providing plausible deniability while carrying out covert government agendas, from espionage to sabotage. Another tactic involves outsourcing cyber operations to so-called “patriotic hackers,” individuals or loosely-affiliated groups who independently undertake missions aligning conveniently with state interests. Even more sophisticated is the covert coordination with cyber mercenaries, professionals for hire who perform digital hits on behalf of nation-states without explicit governmental fingerprints. Shell companies and front organizations further complicate the attribution puzzle, obscuring financial trails and operational ties back to government actors. Semi-official hacker-for-hire markets openly advertise services that, while technically independent, clearly align with government goals, allowing states plausible deniability in publicly sensitive operations.
Political reluctance plays a crucial role in why clear attribution rarely reaches public acknowledgment. Governments frequently hesitate to publicly “name and shame” responsible states, mindful of the diplomatic and political fallout such attribution might trigger. Fear of retaliation or escalation into broader conflicts further discourages open accusations, keeping attribution findings hidden behind closed doors and classified briefings. Intelligence agencies themselves fiercely guard their methods and sources, cautious not to reveal their capabilities or risk their assets merely to prove a point. Business interests, too, lobby vigorously for discretion, fearing that public revelations about breaches could shake consumer trust or damage market confidence. Additionally, governments recognize that widespread attribution could spark public panic or erode trust in institutions—an outcome perhaps more harmful than the cyberattacks themselves.
Despite these complexities, attribution methods have evolved significantly, driven by both advanced technologies and human ingenuity. Frameworks like MITRE ATT&CK allow investigators to perform detailed behavioral analysis, matching attack patterns across incidents and adversaries. AI-driven code fingerprinting tools have emerged, capable of identifying subtle nuances in programming style and malware construction—digital "fingerprints" unique enough to help narrow down suspects. Reverse engineering languages within malware payloads can also reveal linguistic hints, guiding investigators toward specific regions or actors. Collaborative efforts between international intelligence agencies have increasingly yielded richer and more precise attribution insights, though still limited by diplomatic realities. Meanwhile, open-source cyber sleuths and vigilantes have proven remarkably effective, crowdsourcing investigations that occasionally surpass even formal intelligence work.
The digital battleground has thus become a complex web of obfuscation, misdirection, and plausible deniability, intentionally designed by nation-state actors to make definitive attribution as elusive as possible. These layers of deception aren’t merely a clever trick—they are strategically essential, allowing states to achieve their geopolitical goals while carefully avoiding direct confrontation. The digital spies’ toolkit of tricks, proxies, misdirection, and covert alliances continues to expand, forcing defenders into a constant cat-and-mouse game to untangle this intricate web.
Ultimately, understanding the dynamics behind attribution challenges helps cybersecurity professionals and policymakers appreciate the real-world complexity inherent in responding effectively to state-sponsored cyber threats. Attribution isn’t simply about assigning blame; it’s about navigating the delicate interplay between technology, diplomacy, intelligence, and political will. Mastering this intricate process is crucial to building resilience against sophisticated cyber adversaries who have already mastered the art of disappearing into the digital shadows.
How to Survive a Nation-State on Your Network
Surviving a nation-state intrusion requires more than standard cybersecurity measures—firewalls alone simply won’t cut it against adversaries with virtually unlimited resources and ingenuity. Organizations must operate under the realistic assumption of breach; proactively designing networks as if an attacker has already gained entry ensures preparedness and vigilance at every operational level. Adopting zero-trust segmentation, which treats all internal communications as inherently suspicious, limits attackers’ lateral movement and complicates their efforts to escalate privileges. Vigilant monitoring for signs of lateral movement—unusual user behavior, unexpected account usage, or anomalous data flows—is critical for early detection and containment. Additionally, frequent audits of third-party access, coupled with aggressive patch management, protect critical assets from becoming easy targets of opportunity for sophisticated intruders.
Incident response must be approached with the seriousness and intensity of wartime planning, because when nation-states invade your network, the stakes are indeed comparable to battlefields. Organizations should regularly perform pre-breach exercises that mimic real-world advanced persistent threats (APTs), ensuring that security teams are battle-tested rather than simply checklist-ready. Clear and practiced chains of command streamline escalation processes, enabling rapid responses when every minute counts. Robust isolation and containment protocols, pre-established and drilled thoroughly, can quickly limit an attacker’s freedom of action once detected. Forensic readiness through meticulous logging hygiene, coupled with efficient evidence collection processes, helps responders understand the extent of an intrusion quickly and accurately. Developing strong relationships with government Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) ensures access to resources, intelligence, and coordinated assistance when under siege.
In the world of cyber defense, threat intelligence has evolved into an arms race; organizations must continuously upgrade their arsenals to keep pace with agile adversaries. Subscribing to multiple threat feeds provides diverse perspectives on emerging threats, minimizing blind spots and enhancing predictive capabilities. Correlating external intelligence with internal telemetry uncovers hidden patterns or signs of intrusion that might otherwise escape notice. Sharing Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) openly across sectors fosters a collective defense strategy, turning isolated discoveries into a united front against common threats. Learning from global attacks in real-time allows organizations to anticipate new tactics, ensuring defenses evolve proactively. Importantly, relying exclusively on traditional signatures and known malware patterns is inadequate; behavioral analytics and anomaly detection strategies are essential in recognizing advanced and previously unseen threats.
The integrity of supply chains demands relentless vigilance because attackers frequently exploit vendor weaknesses as hidden entry points. Enforcing strict least privilege policies with vendors and contractors significantly narrows the potential attack surface and limits attacker movements should credentials be compromised. Organizations should regularly conduct red-team exercises against third-party security to expose vulnerabilities in supply chain partnerships proactively. Demanding comprehensive Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs) from suppliers creates transparency and accountability, ensuring vendors themselves understand and disclose the full composition of their software products. Monitoring vendor-deployed tools rigorously for anomalous behavior helps detect compromised software before attackers can leverage it. Adopting an attitude of zero implicit trust—verifying every software update, vendor connection, and third-party interaction—turns supply chain risk management into an active and dynamic process rather than a passive compliance task.
Aligning corporate cybersecurity strategies with national policies and advisories amplifies resilience by plugging organizations into broader defensive frameworks. Regularly synchronizing defensive efforts with alerts from entities like the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) or the UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) ensures immediate awareness of emerging threats and mitigation strategies. Supporting and participating in domestic cyber defense coalitions facilitates real-time sharing of critical defensive knowledge and fosters collaborative threat mitigation. Cross-sector tabletop exercises improve collective preparedness, helping diverse organizations simulate coordinated responses to significant cyber events. Proactive lobbying for stronger cyber deterrence laws encourages governments to enact policies that penalize state-sponsored attackers and reduce the frequency and severity of attacks. Building true resilience goes far beyond mere compliance checklists—it demands an agile, coordinated approach capable of adapting quickly in response to changing threat landscapes.
Ultimately, facing nation-state-level threats on your network is akin to defending a fortress under siege—proactive, multilayered defenses coupled with rigorous, ongoing training define survival. Every organization, regardless of size, sector, or apparent attractiveness to attackers, must recognize their role in broader national security frameworks. Adopting an adversarial mindset and understanding that attackers constantly evolve their methods, ensures that cybersecurity teams remain alert, responsive, and always prepared for the unexpected.
Cybersecurity preparedness against nation-states requires a balance of vigilance, ingenuity, and cooperation. Organizations that actively integrate threat intelligence, secure their supply chains, practice proactive defense, and align closely with government strategies and international allies stand the best chance of withstanding even the most determined nation-state attackers. The approach isn’t about eliminating risk entirely but building an adaptable, resilient cybersecurity posture capable of absorbing, responding to, and recovering rapidly from sophisticated state-sponsored cyber intrusions.
Conclusion
Nation-states now execute their geopolitical ambitions through the subtle yet impactful medium of cyberspace, redefining traditional conflict boundaries and challenging conventional security measures. To survive and thrive amid this escalating digital threat landscape, organizations must embrace proactive security measures, rigorously monitor supply chains, cultivate strong threat intelligence capabilities, and align closely with national cybersecurity strategies. Preparing for cyber threats today means understanding and adapting to an environment shaped by advanced persistence, deception, and strategic ambiguity. Successfully navigating these turbulent cyber waters requires vigilance, agility, and constant innovation.
About the Author:
Dr. Jason Edwards is a distinguished cybersecurity leader with extensive expertise spanning technology, finance, insurance, and energy. He holds a Doctorate in Management, Information Systems, and Technology and specializes in guiding organizations through complex cybersecurity challenges. Certified as a CISSP, CRISC, and Security+ professional, Dr. Edwards has held leadership roles across multiple sectors. A prolific author, he has written over a dozen books and published numerous articles on cybersecurity. He is a combat veteran, former military cyber and cavalry officer, adjunct professor, husband, father, avid reader, and devoted dog dad, and he is active on LinkedIn where 5 or more people follow him. Find Jason & much more @ Jason-Edwards.me